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This paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions. It describes the different 
empirical approaches used to explore the nexus between labour market institutions and labour market 
performance. It stresses that the effect of institutions is complex in both stock and flow models and that it is also 
crucial to take into account the interactions they generate among themselves and with macroeconomic shocks. While 
their importance in explaining labour market performances is uncontroversial, there is no full consensus on their 
actual impact and the precise transmission channels. In addition, rather than taking institutions for granted, a new 
branch of research attempts to understand them as the result of an endogenous process. The paper also briefly 
discusses the relationships between the efficiency of the redistributive policies (via taxation) and the type of protection 
provided (on the job or in the market). Lastly, the paper examines the key issue of efficient policy design both at the 
macro- and micro-level. 
 
                                                 
1 Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs - Labour market, taxation and quality of public 
finances Unit. e-mail: alfonso.arpaia@cec.eu.int ; gilles.mourre@cec.eu.int. The views expressed in this paper 
are those of the authors only. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the European Commission. 
Sections of the text may be quoted provided that full credit is given to the source. We thank Declan Costello and 
Giuseppe Carone for their helpful comments.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The variation of labour market responses to common shocks across industrialised countries in 
the late 1970 and early 1980s has widely been documented. While some countries 
experienced an only temporary deterioration in their unemployment prospects, others saw 
high and persistent unemployment even when these shocks faded away (Figure 1 ). The 
improvements observed since the second half of the 1990s, which occurred with no signs of 
price and wage inflation, led many observers to consider them as structural
2. Nevertheless, the 
different patterns of unemployment experienced by European countries can often be related to 
the specific pace at which labour market reforms were introduced.  
 
These differences in unemployment dynamics are captured by the coefficient of variation 
(Figure ). In response to the common supply shocks recorded in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the pick up in the unemployment rate was seen in all countries, as suggested by the 
decline in the coefficient of variation. When the recovery of the late 1980s occurred, few 
countries only (namely Spain, Portugal, the UK and Ireland) managed to recover from the 
high rates of unemployment while most of them experienced either a modest decline or 
further increases (Denmark and Italy). As a consequence of these differentiated reactions, the 
coefficient of variation went up. The employment crisis of the first half of the 1990s, which 
hit all countries but Denmark, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, the UK, attenuated the 
differences in the unemployment rate dynamics across countries. In the second half of the 
1990s, the coefficient of variation continued to fall, suggesting that the improvements 
observed in the EU unemployment rate were equally based across countries.
3 The evidence 
above would suggest that, because of this convergence, the current rate of unemployment 
reflected more a common EU-wide pattern (partly of cyclical nature) than country-specific 
structural factors. 
 
However, this latter interpretation calls for great caution since the unemployment patterns 
remain highly heterogeneous across countries. Indeed, the unemployment distribution is 
skewed to the right (i.e. to high values) and measures of dispersion such as the coefficient of 
variation or the min-max range are much affected by extreme values. The semi-interquartile 
                                                 
2 See for example Decressin et al. (2001) and Garibaldi and Mauro (2002). 
3 One gets to the same conclusion if the dispersion is measured by the range (i.e. the difference between the 
largest and the smallest values) normalised by the simple mean.  
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range (iqr) is an alternative measure of the dispersion little affected by extreme scores, and 
therefore is a good indicator of spread for skewed distributions.
4 When measured in this way, 
the dispersion significantly increased between 1975 and 1999 (with a temporary decline in 
1987 and 1991), strongly declining only in the early years of the new decade (Figure 2). 
Hence, despite the decline in the unemployment rate in many member states, the 
unemployment heterogeneity is so high that talking about “European unemployment” is 
misleading (Blanchard 2005). 
 
Although the explanations of these different unemployment behaviours abound in the 
economic literature (see Blanchard (2005) for a review), there is a growing consensus about 
the key importance of labour market institutions (LMI) in influencing labour market 
performances. For example Bruno and Sachs (1985) relate the differences in labour market 
performances to the interaction between country-specific bargaining structures and common 
supply shocks.
5 Eichengreen and Iversen (1999) argue that, in order to initiate and sustain 
economic growth, labour market institutions should be adaptable to rapidly changing 
technologies of production and increasing heterogeneity of the labour force, while the failure 
to introduce institutional reforms that could overcome collective-action problems in the labour 
market is considered as one source of the poor labour market performance.
6 Similarly, 
Blanchard (2005) refers to the lack of coherence between labour market institutions and the 
macroeconomic environment as the main characteristic of the evolution of the French labour 
market post-war history. Economic institutions are important because they affect the structure 
of economic incentives in society (Acemoglu (2005)).  
 
The interest in labour market institutions has not been limited to academic analyses. Since the 
launch of the OECD Job Strategy and the European Employment Strategy, there has been a 
growing consensus among policy makers on the need to adapt the “rules of game” of the 
labour market to new challenges such as demographic and technological changes, rapid 
                                                 
4 The iqr is computed as an half of the difference between the 75
th percentile and the 25th percentile. This 
measure of dispersion has its advantages with non-symmetrical distributions but is more subject to sampling 
fluctuation in normal distributions than is the standard deviation. Therefore, it is not often used for data that are 
approximately normally distributed. 
5 In particular they developed a theory where unemployment derives from shocks interacting with real and 
nominal rigidities.  
6 In market economies collective-action problems are derived from the decentralised nature of individual 
choices.   
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swings in the international division of labour, etc. This is a major condition to reap the 
benefits of a changing socio-economic environment and avoid its potential pitfalls. 
 
The good performance of countries that have carried out different policies challenges the view 
that one-size-fits-all approach to reforms is adequate to respond to labour market problems. 
Indeed, many observers highlighted the need for looking at the whole configuration of labour 
market institutions as a pre-condition to reform them. More fundamentally, a large interest 
was expressed in the design of labour market reforms.  
 
Consequently, databases have been developed to evaluate the costs of regulation (World Bank 
Doing Business database), to build quantitative indicators characterising the reform progress 
(OECD), to categorise reforms according to their expected effects on labour market flexibility 
and/or their scope - i.e. marginal or radical - (Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti Social 
Reforms Database), to measure de facto labour practices (Global Labor Survey by Chor and 
Freeman (2005)) or to systematically record and track reform measures over time with a 
specific focus on design issues (forthcoming ECFIN LABREF Database)
7.  
 
This paper selectively reviews the empirical evidence and the theoretical arguments of the 
literature on labour market institutions. On this basis it outlines a framework to characterise 
labour market reforms that will be developed in the LABREF Database. The literature on LMI 
has largely focussed on a stock approach to labour markets. The flow approach can be useful 
in understanding why the effect of certain institutions on performance is uncertain. Section 2 
briefly describes these approaches, while Section 3 reviews the literature on LMI and labour 
market performance. This literature has generally treated LMI as exogenous determinants of 
performance. Recently, the attention has been shifted towards understanding the driving force 
behind specific institutional arrangements as a precondition to reform them. Section 4 gives a 
bird’s-eye-view on this debate. Despite the diverse institutional arrangements across 
countries, the literature on LMI has highlighted the great importance of efficient policy 
design. Section 5 will try to identify general principles for achieving an efficient policy design 
both at the macro- and micro-level. 
                                                 
7 The LABREF database is an ongoing project which aims at collecting information on policy measures likely to 
have an impact on the labour market performance and with a specific focus on the policy design. See Arpaia, 
Costello, Mourre and Pierini (2005) “Tracking Labour Market Reforms in the EU Member States: an Overview 
of reforms in 2004 based on the LABREF database”, forthcoming ECFIN Economic paper.  
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2.  Stock and flows approaches to equilibrium unemployment: theoretical effects of 
institutions 
 
The stock approach 
The traditional textbook model of a competitive economy contends that with complete 
markets
8 and perfect information, identical atomistic economic agents determine the labour 
demand and the labour supply optimising their utility/profit function. With perfectly flexible 
prices and wages the economy is always in equilibrium.  
 
Although useful as a benchmark, this model is based on assumptions (complete markets, 
perfect information, atomistic and homogeneous agents, perfect competition), which make it a 
non-realistic description of modern markets. A more realistic description takes into account 
the wage and price formation mechanism in imperfectly competitive markets (Blanchard 
(1986), Layard et al. (1991)). Nominal wages are the result of negotiations between 
employers and employees, while firms set price as a mark-up over labour costs. While in the 
short-run unemployment is determined by the real aggregate demand, in the long-run it 
converges toward the level which is compatible with a stable inflation rate
9. In this 
framework, labour market policies influence labour market performance in three ways: by 
modifying the wage formation mechanism; by changing the price elasticity of product 
demand; and by stimulating technological progress. 
 
Both these models are based on the stock approach, in which the variable of interest is the 
total number (or proportion of persons) in one particular labour market status 
(unemployment mainly but also possibly employment and labour force participation), which 
matches employers’ and employers’ equilibrium. In the neo-classic approach with perfect 
competition, equilibrium unemployment equates total labour demand and total labour supply. 
In Layard-Nickell-type approach with imperfectly competitive markets, equilibrium 
unemployment is so that the employers’ price setting curve meets employees’ wage setting 
curve. 
 
                                                 
8 Markets are complete when it is always possible in the current  period to specify a price for future deliveries 
(forward market) and what each party is to do in every possible circumstance and arrange the distribution of 
costs an benefits in each contingency (contingent markets).  
9 See European Commission (2002) for a simple model of short- and long-run model of output and employment.  
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The flow approach 
Alternatively, one can look at labour market performance as the outcome of a matching 
process between jobs and heterogeneous workers. This flow approach focuses on the 
transition between labour market states (i.e. employment vs. non employment or job vs. no-
job). Aggregate employment is the outcome of a process of continuous job creation and job 
destruction. Search and matching models emphasise the heterogeneity of workers and jobs, 
information imperfections about the characteristics of potential trading partners and the role 
of low mobility that generate labour market frictions. The presence of such frictions 
introduces monopoly rents which affect job creation and job destruction. The outcome of the 
exchange process between those seeking a new job and those posting new vacancies is 
described by a matching function where the existing stocks of unemployed and vacancies are 
inputs and the flow of new hires is the output. In the short-run the number of jobs created can 
differ from that of jobs destroyed, while in steady state the flow into unemployment is equal 
to the flow out of it
10. For a given exit rate from employment into unemployment, any 
increase in the number of vacancies is associated in steady state with a lower unemployment 
rate, a relation named Beveridge curve. Anything that improves the efficiency of the match of 
unemployed people with vacancies and/or reduces the exit rate from employment is likely to 
reduce the level of unemployment which equates in steady state inflows and outflows for a 
given level of vacancies. If the matching process becomes less efficient or the exit rate from 
employment increase, the Beveridge curve shifts outward (i.e. towards the right): at given 
vacancies, a higher unemployment rate is necessary to equate inflows and outflows from 
unemployment. And with imperfect matching of workers with jobs, firms are likely to offer 




                                                 
10 The matching function can be written as M = e m (cU,V) where M is the number of hires from unemployment 
(called also “matches”), U is unemployment, V is vacancies, e is matching efficiency and c is the search 
effectiveness of the unemployed. The function is increasing in both arguments and is often assumed to have 
constant returns. If sE is the flow from employment into unemployment, where s is the exogenous exit rate from 
employment into unemployment and E is employment, then in steady state inflows in unemployment and 
outflows from unemployment coincide; we have sE= M hence s = e m(cU/E, V/E) which is commonly called the 
“Beveridge Curve”. It can be shown that U=s/(s+θq(θ)) where θ=V/U, q(θ)=m(U,V)/V and θq(θ) the probability 
of finding a job. If the matching between vacancies and unemployed becomes less efficient, for given level of 
vacancies e will fall, moving the Beveridge Curve to the right in the U-V space. Likewise, a shift of the 
Beveridge Curve to the right can result from a rise in the exit rate from employment, (negative productivity 
shocks, sectoral reorganisation, decreasing fixed cost of training, increasing job-to-job mobility etc). Conversely, 
an improvement in matching will shift the Beveridge Curve to the left.   
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Complex effects of institutions from a theoretical standpoint 
In both the stock and the flow approaches to equilibrium unemployment, a specific 
configuration of labour market institutions affects firms' hiring and firing decisions, modifies 
the individual readiness and willingness to take up a job and/or the efficacy of unemployment 
in keeping inflationary pressures in check. When one looks at equilibrium unemployment as 
the outcome of the matching process which affects the short-run dynamics by which the long-
run equilibrium (both in terms of stock and flows) is achieved, the effect of certain institutions 
on employment is potentially ambiguous. Indeed, the equilibrium unemployment is 
determined by a web of complex interactions between various institutions (coordination and 
centralisation
11 of wage bargaining, unemployment and welfare related benefits, employment 
regulation and labour taxation), which may operate in different directions and, ultimately, 
have uncertain effects on equilibrium unemployment. Looking in isolation at each labour 
market institution (or its change) may be therefore misleading.  
 
Three examples from the economic theory may help to clarify this point. Firstly, it is well 
known that since job-search effort cannot fully be observed unemployment benefits are 
subject to moral hazard. Unemployment benefits therefore discourage search, reduce the 
incentive to find a job and raise the reservation wages. The increase in workers’ fall-back 
utility in the case that a bargain is not struck reduces the cost of unemployment from 
employees’ viewpoint and increases wage pressures. In equilibrium, unemployment rises and 
employment falls. However, in search models, under the assumptions of risk adverse agents 
and no unemployment benefits, the unemployed are likely to accept jobs even though, at the 
market interest rate, further search would be rewarding in terms of jobs with higher 
productivity and wages. This may be due to capital markets imperfections. In such a context 
and with risk neutral workers, unemployment benefits act as a subsidy that finances 
consumption during search, encourages further search and improves the allocation of 
resources
12. The overall effect is uncertain and depends on whether the design of the 
unemployment benefit system has solved the problems of free-riding and moral hazard.  
                                                 
11 Co-ordination refers to the mechanism whereby the employment consequences of wage claims are taken into 
account in the bargaining process. Centralisation simply refers to the level at which bargaining occurs (plant, 
firm, industry or economy-wide). Hence, co-ordination may occur both in high- and low- centralised system, in 
the latter when employers’ federation assist bargainers to act in concert.  
12 Unemployment benefits also influence the composition of jobs created. In Acemoglu and Shimer (1999 and 
2000) risk-averse workers are ready to accept lower wages in return of higher employment probability. Firms 
respond creating jobs with low risk and low wages. In equilibrium the labour market is characterised by too low-
productivity, low-wage jobs. This allocation can be improved by a moderate increase in the unemployment  
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Secondly, similar arguments hold in the case of active labour market policies (ALMPs). When 
efficiently designed and targeted to those with low re-employment probabilities such as the 
long-term unemployed, these programmes improve the match and reduce the risks of 
dropping out of the labour force. By increasing the competition from the unemployed, 
ALMPs keep up the number of job seekers which contributes to wage restraint. This effect is 
expected to raise employment. However, since improved employment prospects reduce the 
perceived cost of non-employment, ALMPs create also an externality in wage setting which 
reduces the incentives for wage restraint with negative effects on employment performance.  
 
Thirdly, Bertola and Rogerson (1997) find that “despite the stringent dismissal restrictions in 
most European countries, rates of job creation and job destruction are remarkably similar in 
across European and North American labour markets”. The similarity in labour market 
dynamics across the Atlantic, despite significantly different labour market institutions, is 
explained when one looks at the configuration of labour market institutions as a whole. These 
authors show that a model that assumes competitive behaviour on the part of employers and 
workers but with mobility decisions costly for workers, the intensity of relocation in labour 
markets with low firing costs and low wage compression (resulting from highly decentralised 
wage-setting) is similar to that of labour markets with high firing costs and high wage 
compression (as a result of highly centralised wage-setting). By reducing the wage adjustment 
at the margin wage compression increases the adjustment of employment, while labour 
adjustment restrictions dampen job creation and job destruction. Hence, the effect on the job 
flows is ambiguous. The presence of high firing costs may also reinforce the preference for 
rigid wage regimes (Boeri and Burda (2004)). Firing costs compound renegotiation costs in 
their model, further increasing the utility of rigid wage for workers who keep their jobs. 
Different policies can indeed have offsetting effects on the observed job flows. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
benefits from low levels. This increase reduces the distortions created by uninsurable risks and improves the 
matching. In this case, unemployment benefits do not work as a search subsidy but as a way to deal with 
imperfect insurance. The increase in unemployment benefits reduces employment and improves productivity. 
Matching frictions and incomplete insurance are necessary conditions to get these results. In Acemoglu (2001) 
unemployment benefits and minimum wages increase labour productivity because they shift employment toward 
more capital intensive good (i.e. high wage) jobs. These institutions, may improve welfare by encouraging 
workers to wait for high wage jobs.   
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3.  Labour market institutions and labour market performance in the empirical 
literature 
 
During the 1990s there has been a wealth of studies focussing on the effects of institutions on 
employment performance. The main results of several of the most widely cited are 
summarised in Table 1 at the end of the paper. Among these, three main strands may be 
identified. Some studies concentrated on the role of institutions, others focussed on the 
interaction between shocks and institutions. More recent analyses insisted on the 
complementarities between institutions and on the effects of institutions on relative wages and 
on relative employment performance.  
 
Direct impacts of labour market institutions 
In a first set of studies indicators of labour market institutions are used to explain 
differences across-country in unemployment rates (Layard and Nickell (1999)) or the 
evolution of unemployment over time in a panel of OECD countries (Elmeskov et al (1998). 
Unemployment is positively associated with generous unemployment benefits, high tax 
wedge, and high union coverage and negatively associated with ALMPs
13 and high co-
ordination of bargaining. The role of employment protection legislation and union density is 
uncertain. However, a large part of the change in structural unemployment remained 
unexplained. One major difficulty encountered by these studies is that indicators of labour 
market institutions are only slowly time varying, i.e. certain institutions were already in place 
in the 1960s in many EU countries when European unemployment was lower than in the US.  
 
Nickell et al. (2003) propose a model where changes in institutions explain the evolution 
over time of the unemployment level and shift in the Beveridge curve both alone and when 
interacted with variables representing aggregate demand shocks, productivity shocks and 
wage shocks. The benefit duration, union density and low mobility shift the Beveridge curve 
outward (which implies higher equilibrium unemployment), while employment protection 
shifts it inward. When they turn to explaining unemployment, the generosity of the system of 
unemployment benefits (both in terms of levels and duration) and labour taxes increase 
unemployment, although in the latter this happens to a lesser extent in countries with co-
                                                 
13 One should be aware that placement of the unemployed in labour market programmes automatically reduces 
the number of people registered as unemployed. When one includes in the definition of unemployment also those 
participating in such programmes, the effects are usually more uncertain.   
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ordinated wage bargaining (i.e. the interaction between the tax wedge and the degree of 
coordination has a coefficient which declines the more coordinated is bargaining).  
 
Rather than dealing with unemployment behaviour, Mourre (2004) focuses on the impact 
of labour market institutions on employment growth. In particular, he tests a break in 
employment equation for OECD countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s and relates the 
structural break (or absence of such a break) across countries to changes in labour market 
institutions and active labour market policies (along with the change in sectoral structure). 
The countries experiencing a (positive) change in their employment pattern since the late 
1990s are mainly concentrated in the euro area. Among the relevant institutional factors likely 
to have contributed to rising aggregate employment in the euro area in recent years are the 
strong development of part-time jobs, lower labour tax rates and, more tentatively, less 
stringent employment protection legislation and greater subsidies to private employment. 
 
Gomez Salvador et al (2004) use annual information on firm level data from the 
AMADEUS dataset to study the effects of institutions on job flows in Europe controlling for 
the impact of firms characteristics. The empirical analysis suggests that countries with tight 
workers’ protection laws (EPL) have relatively low job reallocation and job creation rates, 
while the effect on the job destruction rate is statistically insignificant. The duration of 
unemployment benefits and the degree of co-ordination of wage bargaining reduces job flows 
while the effect of the tax wedge is significant only in the case of the job reallocation and the 
job creation rate.
14 Finally, employment subsidies dampen the job creation and the job 
destruction rate while the effect on the job reallocation rate is insignificant. 
 
The interactions between labour market institutions and macroeconomic shocks 
A second group of studies tried to reconcile the role of institutions with labour market 
performance focusing on the interactions between labour market institutions and 
macroeconomic shocks. The essence of these studies is that transitory increases in 
unemployment due to shocks may be prolonged by labour market institutions that restrict 
                                                 
14 The effect of the tax wedge does not pass the sensitivity test done by the authors as it is very sensible to the 
country included in the regressions.   
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labour market flows and protract the adjustment of real wages.
15 For instance, in their 
influential paper Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show that macroeconomic shocks explain the 
average rise in the unemployment rates but that institutional variables account for the cross-
country variation in the unemployment rates. More specifically, the authors show that 
economic shocks explain the cross-country heterogeneity in the unemployment rates levels 
only when interacted with LMI. The empirical analysis suggests that the countries with long-
lasting unemployment benefits, high employment protection or little co-ordination of 
bargaining experienced longer periods of high unemployment rates. The basic idea of this and 
other studies conducted under this vein (e.g. Fitoussi et al. (2000)) and Bertola et al. (2001)) is 
that certain institutions protracted the adjustment of wages to temporary shocks and prolonged 
their effects on unemployment, transforming a transitory increase in unemployment into a 
permanent or long-lasting one. Although employment performance is driven by shocks, the 
cross-country heterogeneity in such performance is related to different degrees of real wage 
adjustment which tends to be influenced by the labour market institutions in place.  
 
An alternative view on the sources of unemployment has been explored by Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (1998). They argue that in period of economic turbulence there is a higher probability 
of skills deterioration. When shocks requiring a restructuring of the economy occur, jobs 
destroyed in mature sectors should be replaced by jobs in new sectors where “new skills” will 
be accumulated. When incentives to participate are distorted, for example because of 
generous unemployment benefits or long benefit duration, laid-off workers will not accept a 
reallocation and there can be a phase during the transition where unemployment goes up. The 
longer is the unemployment spell, the higher the risks of skills’ depreciation and the longer 
the unemployment duration. The analysis is in line with the view that incoherence between 
labour market institutions and the economic environment gives rise to high equilibrium 
unemployment.  
 
Nickell et al (2005) explore how much of unemployment patterns can be explained by 
changes in the institutions alone and the additional gains from extending the analysis to the 
interactions between shocks and institutions. Time varying institutions provide a satisfactory 
explanation of long-term unemployment shifts in the OECD countries - about 55% of the 6.8 
                                                 
15 These studies focus on the time variation in the data controlling for country fixed effects and differ from the 
first generation study which use cross country analysis (Nickell (1997)) or random effects models (Elmeskov et 
al. (1998)).  
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percentage points increase in the OECD European countries unemployment rate between 
1960 and 1995
16- while the interaction between shocks, captured as in Blanchard and Wolfers 




The interactions between labour market institutions themselves
  
A third strand of important studies looks at interactions between different labour market 
institutions. Coe and Snower (1997) argued theoretically that a wide range of institutions may 
have complementary effects on unemployment. A simple description of importance of 
complementarities is taken from Belot and Van Ours (2004). In a standard model of imperfect 
competition, unions and firms bargain over the wage (right-to-manage model) to maximise 
their relative rents. Once wages are set firms decide how much workers to hire. In equilibrium 
labour market institutions determines workers’ relative bargaining position. Given standard 
labour demand and wage curve [L
d=g(ω,Ψ) with gω <0; ω=h(L,Θ) with hL >0 ,  ω the wage 
rate and Ψ and Θ representing institutional parameters such as ALMPs, UB, EPL, minimum 
wage etc] it can be shown that the net effect on employment is  
 
 
where χ is a set of common institutional variables affecting both labour demand and labour 
supply. In this model, reforms influence employment through three effects. A labour demand 
shifting effect captured by the derivative gω, a bargaining shifting effect represented by 
χ ωh g an adjustment effect  L h gω that depends on the slope of labour supply and labour 
demand. Conditional to a specific institutional configuration, countries can be ranked 
according to the effects of institutions on employment. For example, an increase in the 
replacement rate shifts the wage curve upwards. However, because of the hypothesis of 
decreasing returns to labour, this increase will have a stronger effect on employment in low- 
than in high tax countries (Figure ).  
                                                 
16 Of these 6.8 percentage points, about 2.6 are accounted by changes in the benefit system, 1.8 by taxes, 1.3 by 
shifts in the union variables and 1 only by pro-workers employment protection law.  
17 The use of time dummies to capture shocks makes the implicit assumption that shocks have been the same 
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Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004) find empirical support to the view that institutions strongly 
affect performance only when their effects on employment reinforce with each other. The 
generosity of unemployment benefits reduces both the unemployment and the employment 
rate which of course implies a decline in the participation rate
18. The existence of a positive 
interaction between labour taxes and the replacement rate, suggests that different 
combinations of the replacement rate and of labour tax rate are consistent with the same 
unemployment rate. The effects of employment protection on the unemployment rate vary 
according to the bargaining level: they are negative when wages are set at the firm level, 
positive when bargaining is at the industry level and insignificant when wages are set at the 
national level. Similarly, union density raises unemployment only in decentralised bargaining 
systems. However, these effects become insignificant when time and country effects are 
included in their regression, implying that that the relationship between performance and 
labour market institutions reflects more fixed differences between countries and time periods 
than within country changes in institutions
19. The presence of complementarities makes 
difficult to predict a priori the response of equilibrium employment to changes in the 
                                                 
18 This result is obtained in equation where indicators of labour market institutions are allowed to interact 
controlling for country and time period fixed effects.  
19 Likewise, Mourre (2004) finds that the significance of the interactions between labour market institutions does 
not appear robust to the specification chosen (logarithm of total employment versus employment rate), except for 
the joint negative effect of total labour taxes and unionisation.  
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institutional variables, the overall effect on employment and unemployment depending on 
how the behaviour of rent seeking agents (i.e. their bargaining position) and the existing 
feedbacks between wages and employment are influenced by such complementarities. 
 
Institutions matter but no full consensus on the role of each institution 
Taken together, these studies suggest that labour market institutions can explain a significant 
share of cross-country differences in labour market performance. This is so even though the 
available indicators of time-varying institutions are far from perfect – in other words, there is 
a degree of measurement error. Changes in institutions alone, however, do not explain the 
evolution of unemployment over time. Time varying institutions, particularly when interacted 
with macro-economic shocks, explain more cross-country differences in unemployment rates 
than the within country evolution of the unemployment rate. 
 
Nevertheless, the studies considered do not reach a complete consensus on the role of each 
labour market institution and the way they interact between each other and with shocks. This 
is perhaps unsurprising given the different specifications and methodologies employed, the 
scope for omitted variables (including theoretically important institutional aspects, such as 
enforcement of benefit eligibility criteria, on which there are few data).
20 Moreover, the 
econometric estimations using macro indicators of labour market institutions tend not to be 
robust, as the latter embed various institutional aspects and mechanisms, which cannot be 
disentangled. The role played by interactions between institutions suggests that certain 
institutional configurations can potentially compensate for the negative effects of each 
institution taken in isolation. However, the fact that labour market institutions are 
multidimensional makes difficult to identify in aggregate panel regressions the impact on 
unemployment of interactions between all different policies, all institutions and all shocks 
(Baker et al (2004), Blanchard (2005), Freeman (2005)).  
 
 
4.  Institutions as the outcome of an endogenous process 
 
Initially, the economic literature tended to consider institutions as given, treating them as 
purely exogenous. A new branch of research attempts to understand better their formation, as 
                                                 
20 See for example Houmann et al (2005).  
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the result of endogenous process. The relevant question is therefore why labour market 
institutions are as they are, and to what extent the current configuration of labour market 
institutions might be desirable despite sometimes their unfavourable impact on labour market 
performance. Broadly speaking there are three basic views.  
 
Legal theory 
The legal theory contends that labour market institutions and regulation are related to the 
historical origins of a country’s laws (Botero et al. (2003)). Common law countries deal with 
market failures by relying more on contracts and private litigation while civil law through the 
direct intervention of the government in the regulation of markets. Moreover, this view 
predicts that common law countries should have less generous unemployment benefits 
because they tend to rely more on markets to provide insurance against labour market risks.
21 
 
The social conflict view 
According to the social conflict view, institutions do not represent the interest of the society 
but of groups that mould institutions in ways that maximise their own rents. Hence, 
institutions do not necessarily coincide with those that maximise total surplus. Anything that 
raises average wages and reduces the likelihood of dismissal will benefit the typical labour 
market ‘insiders’.
22 According to this view, institutions introduce a wedge between labour 
supply and labour demand, interfere with labour market relocation, distort relative price and 
reduce employers’ ability to make adjustment at the intensive and extensive margin in the 
face of unexpected shocks. By impeding wage decompression and mobility they limit the 
possibility of improving workers’ welfare and production efficiency. In terms of labour 
supply, institutions that introduce a wedge between utility maximising outcomes and socially 
efficient outcomes create disincentives to labour market participation and mobility which 
ultimately lead to higher unemployment.  In terms of labour demand, when workers do not 
                                                 
21 The evidence supports this view. Among the EU15 countries, the UK has the lowest expenditure on 
unemployment benefits as percentage of GDP (0.3%).  However, this evidence is only mild as, for example 
Greece and Italy follow the UK with respectively 0.4% and 0.6%. In addition, although income redistribution 
through unemployment benefits is limited in Anglo-Saxon countries, alternative ways are developed to provide 
insurance and income re-distribution.  
22 That is, established worker, probably on a permanent contract and well-represented by labour unions (see 
Lindbeck and Snower (1988)).  
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adjust their wage claims, an increase in employers’ funded social benefit will increase labour 
costs and reduce employment. 
23 
 
In the literature on economic institutions two versions of this view, with different implications 
for the reform strategies to follow, can be identified. The first version considers institutions 
largely shaped in practice by the political power of political groups (Acemoglu et al. (2005)). 
Although endogenous, not all groups will prefer the same set of institutions. Indeed, different 
institutions entail a change in the distribution of resources which is a cause of conflict of 
interest between different groups over the choice of certain institutions. This conflict is likely 
to arise when there are rents that can be extracted by the group with political power that will 
try to shape institutions accordingly to this task. Hence economic institutions are developed to 
facilitate the appropriation of existing rents by certain groups. This implies that good labour 
market institutions are likely to emerge when rents are low. Reducing rents in the good 
markets reduces workers’ incentives to fight for a share of these rents (Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003)) and increase the positive effects of the wage moderation on the 
unemployment rate (Estevao (2005)). Sub-optimal outcomes are also the result of contracting 
problems when policy makers represent only narrow interests (i.e. reforms are not 
comprehensive), cannot take commitments that constrain future actions (Castanheira and 
Esfahani (2003)) or when product market reforms are not sufficiently widespread (Boeri 
(2003)). Moreover, history has taught that the distribution of power can change over time and 
that efficient institutions under certain conditions are unsuitable in a different environment.  
 
The second view considers institutions themselves a source of rents (Saint Paul (2000)).
24 The 
existence of rent-creating institutions creates the opportunities to develop rent-protecting 
institutions. These opportunities are higher the less competitive the labour and product 
markets, the lower the turnover and labour mobility, the higher the gap between the 
productivity of skilled and unskilled workers. The complementarity between rent-creating and 
rent-protecting institutions explains while certain institutions come together (e.g. wage 
compression and strict employment protection regulation) while there is an under-provision of 
                                                 
23 This is likely to occur when workers do not feel the link between taxes or social contributions paid by them 
and their current and future benefits they are entitled to receive.  
24 In Saint Paul (2000) labour market institutions, such as minimum wage, employment protection laws and 
collective agreements, arise as a politico-economic equilibrium from a redistributive conflict between skilled and 
low- and medium-skilled workers and between employed and those excluded from redistribution (the 
unemployed).   
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others (e.g. unemployment benefits). The presence of a status-quo bias is reinforced by such 
complementarities which make reform difficult, if not impossible, without breaking the status-
quo. The viability of reform is therefore strictly dependent upon the job prospects of those 
that, because of particular institutional setting, are excluded from the redistribution. 
Improving their employment chances may gain support against the constituency of the 
insiders. Hence, reforms that preserve the status of the insider introducing more flexible 
arrangements for the outsiders (such as the liberalisation of temporary contracts without 
addressing labour market regulation for other employees, or pension reforms that apply only 
to young workers), although marginal, may reduce according to this view the influence of the 
insiders and contribute to overcome the status quo (Boeri (2003))
25. However, partial labour 
market reforms may lead to higher turn-over of low productivity entry level jobs, higher 
unemployment spells, lower welfare and overall productivity (Blanchard and Landier, 2002), 
which risk putting the economic system on an adjustment path converging toward a two-tier 
system equilibrium.  
 
The efficient institutions view 
According to the third view, institutions are chosen efficiently by weighing their social costs 
against their benefits. Hence, different institutional settings may be efficient ways of dealing 
with market failures in certain circumstances but not in others (Blank and Freeman (1993), 
Blanchard (2002), Botero et al. (2003)). Societal preferences respond to shocks and are 
shaped by how these shocks interact with capital market imperfections that constrain the 
access to activities that reduce unemployment and income risks. Economic institutions are 
important because they modify the structure of economic incentives. In a perfect competitive 
model, institutions distort incentives, generate inefficient outcomes and are clearly 
suboptimal. Because of imperfect and asymmetric information in capital markets, the 
allocation of laissez-faire economies is far from being optimal as predicted by the textbook 
version of competitive markets.  The consequences of incomplete insurance markets have 
been explored in the case of redistributive taxation (Varian 1980), of the determination of 
efficient unemployment insurance with matching frictions (Acemoglu and Shimer (1999))
26, 
of redistributive social policies (Benabou (2000)), of employment protection ((Bertola (2004) 
                                                 
25 This reform strategy is not viable for product market reforms because of the strong opposition of the 
incumbents which is counterweighted by the pressure of the population (consumers) for more competitive 
product markets (Boeri (2003)).  
26 See footnote 10  
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and Bertola and Keoniger (2004)), and in the case of institutions narrowing the wage 
distribution (Agell 2002)
27. Taken together these studies suggest that when capital markets are 
incomplete and/or workers risk averse certain institutional configurations can improve the 
allocation of a competitive economy, although at risks of lower employment. With insurance 
arguments the benefits of insurance should be weighed against the cost of a reduced 
efficiency and, possibly, of higher unemployment and lower output.
28 Although LMI entail 
information costs and deadweight losses, they can also be welfare improving when markets 
are imperfect and incomplete. LMI such as unemployment benefits and EPL are motivated by 
the desire of credit-constrained risk-averse agents to protect their consumption from income 
volatility, even though consumption smoothing can occur at the expense of production 
efficiency and low employment
29. Indeed, the insurance element of these institutions interacts 
with their rent-seeking dimension, which reduces the cost of non-employment and makes the 
wage distribution more compressed at the cost of low employment rates, especially for those 
with high labour supply elasticity (women and young workers). Hence, high level of social 
insurance is consistent with low unemployment and high participation as long as it is provided 
efficiently. 
 
Rationale for “inefficient” configuration of labour market institutions  
The desirability of such types of “interference” clearly depends on the characteristics of 
financial markets (Bertola and Koeniger (2004))
30, on the frequency and nature (sectoral or 
aggregate) of labour demand shocks, on structural characteristics of the economy
31 and on the 
                                                 
27 In this model an increase in the reservation wage induces the union to “purchase” additional insurance through 
wage compression while an increase in the wage elasticity of labour demand, namely the marginal cost in terms 
of unemployment of a redistributive wage policy, makes wage structure less compressed.  
28 The effects on employment and output depend on whether the insurance provided interfere (as in the case of a 
monopoly union flattening the wage distribution) or not (as when insurance is provided by government transfers) 
with relative factor prices.  
29 The higher wages for those remaining employed and financing the income of non-employed individuals have a 
first order effect on the welfare of risks-averse workers who prefer to smooth consumption inter-temporally 
across different states of the world (Bertola and Keoniger (2004) and Bertola (2004)). 
30 The authors show that show that there is a significant correlation between EPL and borrowing constraints, 
which the authors relate to the attractiveness of institutions reducing labour income fluctuations in countries 
where under-developed financial systems reduce consumption smoothing opportunities. 
31 For example, Hassler et al. (2001) argue that less mobile workers acquire more specialised skills and prefer 
more generous unemployment insurance. The negative relationship between the mobility rate and unemployment 
insurance is strongly supported by the data. On average high mobility countries are characterised by low 
unemployment insurance while low mobility countries have the most generous unemployment insurance system 
(Hassler et al. 2001). At the same time generous unemployment benefits make specialised workers more 
selective, since they have more to lose from switching to a different job, which increases the proportion of 
specialised workers and reduces their mobility. The prevalence of sector-specific shocks endogenously raises the  
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efficiency of collective social insurance schemes. The substitution between unemployment 
benefits and EPL in the provision of insurance against labour market risks has been 
documented by many researchers (e.g. Buti et al (1998) Boeri et al. 2003))
32. Figure  displays 
a version of this trade-off slightly different from the one commonly documented. On the 
horizontal axis the figure reports the expenditure on unemployment benefits per unemployed 
divided the GDP per capita. This measure indicates the proportion of GDP per capita 
allocated to unemployment benefits per unemployed. The rate of substitutions between these 
two institutions is related to the extent individuals can self-insure against unemployment risks 
by accessing to developed financial market (e.g. Bertola 2004 and Boeri et al. (2003)) and to 
the existence of other instruments of insurance and income re-distribution. For this reason, the 
UK and Ireland, both with EPL and UB lower than the EU average, have been excluded. In 
this case a positive and statistically significant (at 90%) relationship is found with a pairwise 
correlation coefficient of 0.5. 
 
The substitution between these two institutions can be related to the form of redistributive 
policies. The choice of redistributive institutions that smooth out unemployment risks reflects 
the efficacy of both market and non-market mechanism in delivering such redistribution. 
When redistribution policies are less efficiently managed through taxes and subsidies, 
insurance against income risks is usually provided via strong employment protection 
legislation. Figure  is suggestive of this nexus between the equalising properties of 
redistributive policies and the intensity of labour market regulation provided by employment 
protection legislation. It displays on the on the vertical axis an overall index of strictness of 
EPL
33.  The horizontal axis reports a measure of the redistributive effects of tax- benefits 
obtained as the difference between the Gini coefficients of income before and after tax-
benefits, excluding pensions; the more redistributive is the tax and benefit systems the lower 
is the fall in the market (i.e. before tax and benefits) income inequality. The chart suggests a 
strong relationship between redistribution of tax-benefits and EPL. The pairwise correlation 
between the EPL and the redistributive effects of the tax-benefit system is 0.7, which is 
                                                                                                                                                         
need for unemployment insurance and is associated with a relatively high unemployment rate and rate of 
specialisation.  
32 Boeri et al (2003) derive the trade-off as a politico-economic equilibrium where a specific configuration 
depends on the skill and age structure of the working population.  
33 We use the EPL version 2 which is appropriate for cross-countries comparisons as it includes specific 
requirements for collective dismissals not included in the version 1 index useful for tracking the time evolution 
of the strictness of the labour market regulation (OECD (2004)).  
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statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. Hence, more redistributive tax-benefit 
systems have less strict EPL.  
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5.  The policy design at the macro- and micro-level 
 
While labour market performance is clearly influenced by the mismatch between institutions 
and the economic structure (Buti et al. (1998), Boeri (2003)), the link between institutions and 
performance is certainly not stable over time. The increased degree of competition in the 
product markets (Boeri (2003)) and the nature of technological progress have changed the 
labour market response to pre-existing labour market institutions (Mortensen and Pissarides 
1999). In a context of redistributional conflict between employers and employees, labour 
market institutions that maximise social welfare when markets are relatively closed turn out to 
be too costly in terms of employment loss when markets become more exposed to the 
international competition.
34 (Bertola and Boeri (2002), Bertola (2004)).  
 
When the change in the structure of production requires less wage compression to improve 
the relative employment performance of groups at higher risks of labour market exclusion, 
institutions motivated by insurance arguments may not be anymore welfare improving. Of 
course, the presence of institutional complementarities not only potentially minimise the 
negative effects of what is considered in isolation an ill-designed measure, but makes each 
institution in isolation more difficult to reform. When feedbacks between institutional 
arrangements and agents’ preferences characterise the structure of economic interactions, the 
role of policy design, at both the macro and the micro level, becomes crucial to achieve the 
objective of a well functioning labour market.  
 
5.1 The policy design at the macro-level: bargaining institutions and policy 
packaging 
 
Bargaining institutions and wage setting: is centralised or decentralised bargaining better? 
At the macro level, a well functioning labour market should be able to absorb increasing 
flows of employment and participation in such a way as to reduce the rate of unemployment 
consistent with a stable inflation rate. The need for growth- and stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policies underlined by BEPGs can effectively be supported by a wage- 
                                                 
34 These institutions put a wedge between labour demand and labour supply that can be desirable from 
distributional viewpoint. As a stronger product competition reduces the price mark-up and makes labour demand 
more wage elastic, deregulating product markets increases the wedge, raising pressure to reform the labour 
market institutions and the cost of non-reform.   
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formation mechanism which sets wage growth in line with price stability and productivity 
developments. The wage-formation mechanism is characterised by different levels of 
bargaining. Theoretical analyses and empirical testing have shown how both highly 
centralised (at national or multi-industry level) and decentralised (at the level of firms) 
bargaining systems perform better than intermediate ones (at the level of industries), as the 
co-operative behaviour of the former creates incentives to moderate wage claims, while 
market forces restrain wages when bargaining occurs at the plant level
35. More uncertain is 
the relative ranking of centralised and decentralised bargaining. The evidence on OECD 
countries (Boeri et al. (2001)) suggests that high co-ordination tends to be associated with 
lower unemployment than decentralised bargaining, while union density and coverage 
account less than levels of co-ordination for differences in the unemployment rates across 
countries. However, either because of wage floors or minimum wages, coordinated bargaining 
also entails greater wage compression (more at the bottom than at the top of the distribution 
(Blau and Kahn (1996)), with negative effects on relative employment. Blau and Kahn (2000) 
show that bargaining institutions compress the wage distribution and raise the relative wage of 
specific socio-economic groups (young men, young women, less-educated men, less educated 
women), which results, especially for men, in lower relative employment, while in the case of 
women the higher relative wages raise the employment rate along a positively sloped labour 
supply. The wage compression also modifies the industry distribution of employment shifting 
employment away from industries with low wages (Davis and Henrekson (2000)) and widens 
the existing regional disparities. In contrast, decentralised bargaining allows higher relative 
wage flexibility, leaves wider room for bargaining on issues such as pay, working time, and 
working condition. It also makes possible the introduction within firms of performance related 
pay schemes where wages are used to motivate and improve workers’ productivity.  
 
                                                 
35 The relationship between wage levels and centralization is hump-shaped: unemployment is higher with 
intermediate bargaining than at the decentralised or centralised level The hump derives from the balancing of 
two opposite mechanisms: 1) the internalisation of a negative externalities, which reduces wage pressure and 2) 
the internalisation of a positive externality which increases wage pressure. Anything changing this balance, 
being either the relevance of input-output links or the extent of foreign competition changes the shape of the 
curve. For example, with strong externalities across industries, the relationship becomes downward sloped: the 
level of wages decline with the level of centralisation of bargaining. The level of employment rises with the level 
of centralisation/co-ordination along a negatively sloped employment-wages relationship (Calmfors (1993)). The 
slope turns positive when one takes into account the influence of unions in the political process determining 
labour taxation and its structure. In Gruber et al. (1993) wage bargaining affects performance through a fiscal 
externality. Centralised unions look through the budget, and internalise the effect of their wage claims on the tax 
base and on the provision of public goods that enter into the union utility function: labour taxation is higher but 
less distorting.   
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In practice, it is not clear whether the balance of advantages and disadvantages is in favour of 
centralised or decentralised bargaining, not least because bargaining often takes place at two 
levels, which blurs the distinction between centralised and decentralised wage settings. On the 
one side, centralisation delivers wage restraint and relative wage rigidity, on the other 
decentralisation favours relative wage flexibility and discourages wage moderation (Calmfors 
(1993), especially when in two-tier systems negotiations result in a wage drift (local money 
increases in excess of those agreed at higher levels of bargaining). In the context of a 
monetary union and to reduce regional disparities, a gradual shift from centralised towards 
more decentralised bargaining is clearly desirable, perhaps with an adequate mix of both 
systems. For example, a two-tier system that establishes at the central level the framework of 
labour regulation and the wage growth compatible with price stability and leaves at the 
decentralised level room for bargaining according to local and or sectoral conditions can 
replicate the positive aspects of both and be welfare improving.   
 
Broadening the reform package?  
As argued in the previous section, the presence of an opportunistic behaviour may give rise to 
a status quo bias which will keep inefficient institutions form changing. Moreover, because of 
a general uncertainty on the costs and benefits from reform, different socio-economic groups 
could be engaged in a war of attrition - it takes time for each part to learn about the costs that 
the other can bear and the conflict can be brought to a standstill - which delays the reform 
process (Alesina and Drazen (1991)). Finally, when reforms entail distributive effects (i.e. 
they are expected to favour certain socio-economic groups but not others), uncertainty about 
who will gain from reform can prevent its adoption when the winners cannot commit to 
compensate ex-post the losers (Fernandez and Rodrick (1990)).  
 
An institutional framework that can handle hold-up problems
36 may enhance the cooperation 
between social partners and government and develop a sense of trust which makes reforms 
process credible. Under these circumstances, the packaging of reforms and a framework 
which promote co-operation may make reforms politically feasible. By exploiting the 
interactions between institutions, a strategy where different measures are part of a long term 
policy package can make reforms viable in the long term. Co-ordination may be achieved 
                                                 
36 In general, when one party has made investment specific to the relationship, other parties can capture some of 
the returns from her investments. Hold-up problems arise when each part cannot commit to compensate the other 
or not to behave ex-post in its own interest.  
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either by formal contacts between the social partners and the government or by the 
government incorporating ex-post the practices developed by the social partners in the 
collective agreements.   
 
However, a broad reform strategy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a reform 
process to be viable. When there is an uncertainty on the transitions cost of comprehensive 
reforms, the high reversal costs that are perceived by the agents may make ex-ante the reform 
unfeasible. In contrast, a gradual approach may make reforms feasible by reducing the costs 




5.2 The detailed design of labour market policies at the micro level  
 
The key principles for a better design of incentives at the micro level should apply 
independently of countries’ specific characteristics
38. However, it should be taken due account 
of the trade-off between efficiency and equity, which is likely to exist in many instances. The 
key principles are the role of incentives, the need for targeting and the good functioning of 
institutions in charge of implementing labour market policies. 
 
The trade off efficiency/equity: does it exist in all cases? 
At the micro level, a well functioning labour market requires reforms that price in workers 
with low labour market attachment and improve the matching between unemployment and 
vacancies. A well functioning labour market should also be inclusive, i.e. reduce the risks of 
marginalisation and of long-term unemployment. This is also the level where labour market 
policies meet social policies. The debate on how to reform the European labour market has 
been often dominated by the perception that there is always an inescapable trade-off between 
equity and efficiency, as if European countries were at any time on the frontier of this trade-
off.  
 
                                                 
37 In the theory of investment, uncertainty with irreversible investment makes delaying such investment valuable 
even when the net present value is positive because the option to wait for the resolution of uncertainty gives a 
value to postponing the decision.  
38 Weighing the different dimensions of policy design against each other may however requires a consideration 
of the labour market problems, which often tend to have strong country-specific characteristics (low participation 
rates, low employment rate of older workers, strong regional disparities, and long-term unemployment).  
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Although the management of taxes and transfers entail administration and deadweight costs 
and risks of “welfare dependency”, one can envisage situations where policy design reduces 
the leakage that society has to endure in order to achieve efficient social policies. When the 
proportion of governments’ budgets going to non-redistributive purposes is high and the 
levels of redistributive taxation low, there are policy situations that produce greater equity 
without major efficiency trade-off and there can be even complementarities between equity 
and efficiency. The costs in terms of efficiency loss of transfers to individuals are likely to be 
small when they go to segment of the population with no capacity of changing their behaviour 
(i.e. lack of recipient agency makes), when benefits are paid conditional to behavioural 
requirements when payments change the behaviour or the opportunities in such a way that 
increase income in the future (R. Blank, (2001)). While the first condition holds only in the 
case of social policies stricto sensu (e.g. policies that deal with poverty), the others are clearly 
relevant for the labour market policies. This brings to the role of effective designing of 
policies at the micro level.  
 
The crucial role of incentives: conditionality, monitoring, job search assistance and sanctions 
The experience of successful reforms highlights the role played by incentives (Madsen, 
(1998) Van Ours (2003) De Koning et al. (2004) Blundell (2004)). Successful reforms are 
generally based on the carrot (i.e. unemployment benefits when the tight eligibility conditions 
are fulfilled) and stick (sanctions). 
 
All the available evidence suggests that the benefit regime defined by its eligibility 
requirements and qualification rules can be even more important than the level of 
unemployment benefits. One cannot exclude risks of benefit dependence, for example when 
an unemployed failing to find a job during the benefit period simply transfers to another form 
of income support, therefore without modifying his/her non-employment duration 
dependence. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the threat of loosing benefits if an 
employment offer is not accepted tend to raise the incentive to find a work (Jensen, Rosholm, 
Svarer (2003)). Benefits should be therefore conditional on active search.  
 
Hence, well designed measures should take into account the effects on both the incentives to 
work and participate (Carone and Salomaki (2005)). Measures to increase the incentive to 
stay and enter into the labour market cannot be considered independently of the interaction  
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between active and passive policies. The provision of unemployment benefits or other form of 
assistance should be conditional on job search and participation in job placement programs. 
Subsidies to employers, directed job creation and training measures are more cost-effective 
when targeted to disadvantaged groups. Similarly, job search assistance and counselling tend 
to be more successful when tailor-made and based on intensive screening.  
 
The UK experience with the New Deal for Young People is quite interesting. Those 
participating in the programme before having the option of getting subsidised training, a wage 
subsidy paid to an employer or a government provided employment, have to go trough a 
“Gateway” period where they are assigned a “personal advisor”. Participation in the 
programme is mandatory and those refusing to participate could lose their entitlement to the 
benefits. The evidence suggest that during this period, 40% of those going through the 
Gateway moved into unsubsidised jobs, 13% into subsidised employment, 30%in training or 
in job offered by the voluntary sector or by the Environmental task force (Bell et al. (1999). 
More generally, a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most 
effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction, 
allowing for higher benefits than otherwise (Fredriksson and Holmlund (2004)). The 
experience of the Netherlands, where the conditions to claim benefits under the illness scheme 
have been gradually tightened, is also interesting. In the 1990s, the disability insurance 
premium was experience rated, the duration of benefits limited to five years after which a re-
examination had to take place, the disability examination no longer took the availability of 
suitable jobs with respect to education and previous occupation into consideration (Nickell 
and van Ours 2000). More recently employers and employees carry more responsibility for 
inflow of workers into disability (Van Ours (2003)).  
 
The need of targeting active policies towards groups at higher risks 
Successful reforms improved labour market performance when they modified the 
participation behaviour of groups with low labour market attachment (women, older workers, 
low skilled). This occurred when activation measures to tighten the eligibility conditions of 
unemployment benefits were combined with targeted measures directed towards groups at 
higher risks of inactivity or unemployment (De Koning et al. (2004), Van Ours (2003) and 
Madsen (1998)). For example hiring subsidies to employers tend to have high costs per net 
job creation, because of displacement and deadweight effects. However, the evidence  
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suggests that they can be effective when targeted to disadvantaged groups (e.g. long-term 
unemployed). 
 
The good functioning of institutions in charge of implementing labour market policies 
Besides the quality of the design based on effectiveness or efficiency, a major problem of 
implementation arises. Taking the current example of “Hartz” packages in Germany, Fertig 
and Kluve (2004) stress the importance of the policy implementation and of the quality of 
administrative instruments when evaluating comprehensive labour market reforms.  
 
The functioning of policy-implementing institutions can be a substantial factor for success. 
For instance, the adaptation of policy bodies to local conditions (decentralisation) and the 
participation of civil society and business (partnership), the appropriate number of well-
trained and qualified staff may be as useful as the policy definition on paper (see OECD, 
2003). The lack of synergy between institutions in charge of different tasks but with same 
targeted group can jeopardise the policy efficiency. An example is the absence of cooperation 
in many countries between the public placement agency and the unemployment benefit 
bodies. Moreover, the active job search assistance cannot properly work if the staff of public 
placement agency is performing purely administrative tasks (jobless recording and 
accounting) and has no knowledge of the labour market. This implies suitable training to 
improve the ability of counsellors to better advise and assist the job seekers. It can also be 




6.  Concluding remarks 
 
Among both policy makers and academics, there is a growing consensus on the need to adapt 
labour market institutions to the changing structure of markets and to the more rapid path of 
technological progress. Because of the complexity of labour market problems, a one-size–fits-
all approach appears as unrealistic. Nevertheless, as underlined by the selective review of the 
literature in this paper, some elements are common to most of the successful reform 
strategies.  
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The economic literature conveys a couple of key messages for policy makers. First of all, 
since the effect of institutions is complex, it is crucial to take into account the interactions 
they generate among themselves and with policy shocks. While their importance in labour 
market performance is undisputed, there is no full consensus on their actual impact and the 
precise transmission channels. Second, the institutions cannot be considered as a hindrance 
per se to the flexible working of the labour market, given their evolving nature. Indeed, their 
impact and the balance of their costs and benefits may change overtime: an institution is 
created to tackle a specific problem at one point in time, which might not exist any longer in 
the next period. In short, a good institution could turn bad (becoming not only useless but also 
counterproductive) when historical circumstances change. Third, institutions cannot be 
assessed from a pure economic standpoint, as they impact not only economic efficiency but 
also often serve equity or redistributive purposes. They cannot be understood with paying due 
attention to their redistributive and welfare effects. For instance, EPL for instance is more 
than a mere economic rigidity. It is also an unemployment insurance scheme and should be 
analysed in a broader context with proper consideration of the unemployment benefit systems. 
Fourth, the redistributive role of institutions also stresses the need of not underestimating their 
political economy dimension (i.e. their supports in society and the political class) before 
reforming them. Fifth, the literature has underlined the crucial role of the policy design 
(exploiting positive interactions, targeting and setting of efficient implementing institutions, 
etc.). 
 
The literature has also drawn the lessons of the economic history of the last decades. Over 
recent years, several EU countries started to change their labour market institutions often 
introducing partial reforms that only involved specific segments of the workforce. The 
experience of the most successful countries suggests that an effective reform requires major 
policy shifts at the macro and micro level. At the macro-level a shift occurred in the wage 
setting mechanism, through a redefinition in rules, norms and nature of contractual 
arrangements, and in the characteristics of policy designed to protect workers from labour 
demand shocks (e.g. EPL or unemployment insurance schemes). At the micro-level the 
successful changes in these institutions were generally based on an adequate combination of 
measures: unemployment benefits for a short period of time coupled with an active role of 
public employment services (e.g. efficient and individualised job search advice, timely 
information on vacancies and job seekers) followed by a range of targeted measures to those 
unable to find a job in the benefit period (e.g. retraining, literacy courses, traineeships).   
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The extensive use by several countries of policies restricting the labour supply, such as early 
retirement or disability benefits, is no longer a viable policy, not only for its adverse 
consequence on the sustainability of public finance, but also because it is based on the wrong 
assumption that the number of jobs or hours worked is fixed (the “lump-of-labour fallacy”), 
while the evidence suggests that high employment and high participation go together. The 
wrong perception that labour market problems could be cured through early exits was 
accompanied by an inefficient shift of governmental expenditure toward passive spending 
(pensions, various income support schemes, etc.). The excessive transfers from those working 
to those out of the labour force undermined the efficient allocation of public resources and 
broke the balance between social assistance (i.e. the assistance toward those at high risks of 
poverty and social exclusion) and social security (unemployment and welfare related 
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Table 1  The main results of recent studies 
Labour market institutions and Labour market performance 
Study  Countries and Periods   Institutions considered  Results  
1.  Aggregate performance  
Elmeskov et al. 
(1998) 
Static Panel data on 19 OECD 
countries over the period 1983-
1995 (GLS random effects).  
Tax wedge (TW) 
 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 
Spending on ALMPs (ALMPU) 
EPL 
 
Minimum wage (MW) 
Co-ordination/Centralisation (CO) 
 
Union density (UD) 
Small positive effects. Positive and significant only in 
countries with intermediate co-ordination  
Positive effects, larger in countries that spend more on 
ALMPS 
Negative effects if Sweden is excluded  
Positive effects. Positive and significant only in countries 
with intermediate co-ordination  
Insignificant effects 
Negative effects in high centralised/co-ordinated and 
decentralised countries 
Insignificant effects 
























Cross Section on 20 OECD 
countries (GLS random effects) 
 
 
Tax wedge (TW) 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
Spending on ALMPs (ALMPU) 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD) 
Union Coverage (UC) 
Owner Occupation rate 
Effects on employment rate 
Similar effects. UD, UC, GRR ALMP insignificant 
Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) 
Static Panel data on 20 OECD 
countries over the period 1960-
1995.  
 
Interactions of time fixed 
institutions with TFP, real interest 
rate and labour demand shocks  are 
considered with non-linear least 
squares  
Tax wedge (TW) 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
 
Spending on ALMPs (ALMP) 
EPL 
 
Minimum wage (MW) 
Co-ordination/Centralisation 
 
Union density (UD) 
 
Union Coverage (UC) 
Positive effects 
Positive effects. Among most significant when interacted 
with shocks  
Positive effects. Among most significant when interacted 
with shocks 
Positive effects 
Positive effects but weaker when Spain is dropped from 
sample 
Positive effects 
Positive effects. Among most significant when interacted 
with shocks 
Positive effects. Among most significant when interacted 
with shocks 
Insignificant effects 
Fitoussi et al. 
(2000)  
Two steps approach.  
First step: Over the period 1960-
1998 for 19 OECD countries, a 
dynamic panel (fixed effects) 
estimate of unemployment 
persistency and sensitivity to macro 
shocks is obtained.  
Second step: Cross section of 
(short- and long-run) fixed effects 
and sensitivity coefficients to 
labour market institutions  
Macro-variables: world real interest rate , 
trend labour productivity growth, ratio of 
non wage support to labour productivity, 
direct taxes, payroll taxes, inflation rate 
 
Labour market institutions: Replacement 
rate (GRR), benefit duration (BD), union 
density, (UD) union co-ordination (CO), 
union coverage (UC), active labour 
market expenditure (ALMP) 
At least 50% of cross country differences in unemployment 




cross country differences in unemployment are a positive 
function of GRR, UD, CO and a negative of UC 
 
cross country differences in sensitivity of shocks are a 
positive function of BD, UD and a negative CO and ALMP 
Nickell et al (2002)  Dynamic Panel data on 20 
countries over the period 1961-
1995. (GLS estimates) 
 
Tax wedge (TW) 
 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD)  
 
Owner Occupation rate 
Effects on unemployment rate 
Positive effects. Larger in countries with high 
degree of bargaining co-ordination 
Positive effects. Larger in countries where the duration  of 




Positive effects, reduced when co-ordination is bargaining is 
high 
Insignificant effects 
Effects on employment rate 
Similar effects. Only Benefits duration are insignificant 
Belot and Van 
Ours  (2004) 
Static Panel data on 17 OECD 









Effects on unemployment rate 
Insignificant effects.  
Negative effects. The effect of GRR is larger in countries 
with a high tax rate  
Insignificant. Effect of the interaction with centralisation 
ambiguous  
Insignificant effects  
  - 34 -
Union density (UD) 
Union density* Centralization 
 
 
Insignificant effects  
Positive  




Static Panel data, (OLS and 





































Mourre (2004)  Dynamic Panel data (GLS 
estimates) on 10 euro area countries 






Bargaining  Coordination 
Union density 




(Lower) Tax wedge  
(Lower) EPL  
(Higher) Part-time employment rate 
(More) Private employment subsidies 
Unionisation, 
Benefit replacement rate,  
Benefit duration  
Other ALMPs (public employment 
services, labour market training and 
direct job creation in the public 
sector) 
Effect on employment (number of people and rate of 
employment) 
Negative 
Negative (although not very robust) 
Positive 
Negative (but low significance) 
Positive (but low significance) 
Insignificant 
Contribution to the positive break in employment pattern in 
the late 1990s (cross-section) 
Yes 
Yes (but less clear) 
Yes (but less clear) 





Nickell et al (2005)  Dynamic Panel data on 20 
countries over the period 1961-
1995. (GLS estimates) 
 
Tax wedge (TW) 
 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 




Union density (UD) 
 ∆Union density (UD) 
Owner Occupation rate 
Effects on unemployment rate 
Positive effects. Larger in countries with high 
degree of bargaining co-ordination 
Positive effects. Larger in countries where the duration  of 
unemployment benefits is high  
Positive effects 
Insignificant effects 
Negative effects, stronger in countries where union density is 
high  
Insignificant 
Positive effects  
Insignificant effects 
Effects on employment rate 
Similar effects. Only Benefits duration are insignificant 
2.  Relative performance 
Effect on employment rate of middle- relative to low-skilled 
Men Women 
Kahn (2000)  Static panel data over the period 




Union density (UD) 







Effect on relative employment rate 
Prime age vs. youth  Prime age vs. older  Bertola Blau Kahn 
 
Static Panel data on 17 OECD 
 
Men   Women  Men  Women  
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Tax wedge (TW) 
replacement rate year 1 
replacement rate year 5 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD) 
Union coverage (UC)  
Public pension replac. Rate 
Replac. rate older workers 
Disabil. Replac. rate  
Female retirement age  
Male retirement age  





















































Effect on the relative unemployment rate 
Prime age vs. young   Prime age vs. older 
 
Men Women Men Women 
(2002)  countries over the period 1960-
1999. (GLS estimates)  
Tax wedge (TW) 
replacement rate year 1 
replacement rate year 5 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD) 
Union coverage (UC)  
Public pension replac. Rate 
Replac. rate older workers 
Disabil. Replac. rate  
Female retirement age  
Male retirement age  





















































Effect on the relative unemployment rate 










Static unbalanced panel data on 19 
OECD countries  
Tax wedge (TW) 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
Spending on ALMPs (ALMP) 
EPL 
Strictness of temporary contracts 
Relative Minimum wage (MW) 
Co-ordination/Centralisation 
Union density (UD) 
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